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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Accounting, Auditing and Financial 
Management at the International Hellenic University.  
 
Prior literature has already proved the relation between tax aggressiveness 
with ownership structure. In this research I indicate the level of tax aggressive planning 
among family and non-family firms in Greece, taking a sample of Greek listed firms on 
the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) covering a five year period from 2013 to 2017. The 
importance of defining tax aggressiveness in Greece in terms of ownership structure is 
significant due to both the high detected level of tax avoidance and the financial crisis. 
Moreover I summarize in literature how aggressive tax planning can be measured, 
factors that can affect tax aggressiveness as well as the important role of the corporate 
governance (structure) and agency theory which according to literature are crucial 
factors to examine in such a topic. Also, borrowing capacity and effects on tax 
aggressiveness is been examined trying to armor our research and consistently make a 
new hypothesis.  
Regarding the research methodology and analysis 190 companies listed in the 
ASE has been used in order to find correlation between family and non-family firms 
with tax aggressiveness based on 950 metrics. The findings provide us with notable 
evidence concluding that family firms are more tax aggressive than non-family firms, 
indicating that family firms pay less taxes. As far as the second hypothesis we find that 
borrowing capacity doesn’t meet any relation with tax aggressive planning. 
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1. Introduction 
In this dissertation, we investigate the impact of ownership structure of a 
company to the level of tax aggressiveness, considering specific criteria, in the Greek 
Region. To define ownership structure we create two categories of family and non-
family firms and we examine the following hypothesis: Are Greek family firms more tax 
aggressive than non-family firms. Also we launch agency theory as one significant 
parameter in how ownership structure affects corporations tax planning as it is a 
common practice for family firms to try to benefit from opportunities that tax policies 
provide. Chen et al. (2010) defines tax aggressiveness as the “downward management 
of taxable income through tax planning activities”, considering both legal and illegal 
ones. Undoubtedly, corporations try eternally to reduce their costs to gain profit. One 
of these “fixed” costs is also taxes, which managers and equity holders try to overcome 
via actions that could lead to the decrease of tax range. Assuming all this facts, we 
could not express a certain opinion about if aggressive tax planning lead to the 
maximization of firm’s value as there are potential costs both tangible (penalties by 
authorities) and intangible (reputation loss) that should be taken into consideration, 
Hanlon & Slemrod (2009).  
              Moreover, borrowing capacity in relation to tax aggressiveness in Greek listed 
firms is been examined as our second hypothesis, using Coverage ratio to answer to 
the correlation with tax aggressiveness. Motivating source was the paper from A. 
Sikalidis & S. Leventis (2016), as well as our research that coverage ratio is related to 
ETR so it can be connected with tax aggressiveness. 
              However, mentioning all the above, this study is referred to Greece and there 
is a multiple background for this decision. After financial crisis burst in Greece World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank noticed that tax 
avoidance in Greece is in high level and proposed new regulations and laws that could 
control that phenomenon with a goal to decrease it, in order to be Greece’s creditors. 
It is a fact that Greece is also a country with unstable tax policies as well as lack of tax 
impositions is easily detected. Specifically, this instability can be presented by the new 
law for corporate and individual taxation (Law 4172/2013) that been voted in 2013 and 
replaced corporate taxation from 24% to 29%. In early 2000nds Bronchi C. (2001), 
3 
 
characterizes the Greek tax system as a complicated and non-transparent system. This 
is the first reason that motivates us to investigate the relation between ownership 
structure and tax aggressiveness. Secondly, Greece is a country with a a large number 
of Small and medium sized companies among EU and most of them are family business 
as Spyros Vassiliadis (2014) said.                    
Particularly Greek listed firms presents a great concentration of family 
ownership as from our research we assumed that from the biggest companies in 
Greece the majority of them are controlled by few families, while same time a mean 
value has a family member in the top management or hold stakes up to 10%. Finally, 
we consider the huge gap of corporate governance in Greece and the lack of well 
structured Boards of Directors as a motive to analyze the ownership structure into 
families and non-families.  
This research and its expected outcomes, provide new evidence to accounting 
and finance literature in Greece as the studies regarding the specific topic are quite a 
few and are detected mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries (US,UK), referring to corporate 
ownership and tax aggressiveness. Regarding that issue, our research will add, by its 
empirical analysis, new scientific facts that can contribute to the further investigation 
about tax aggressiveness in Greece. Also, the focus to borrowing capacity can add a 
new evidence on Greek literature about the connection with tax aggressive planning, 
widening the horizons of the research for those two cases. Finally, this dissertation 
could give a more clear illustration of ownership in Greece, how agency conflict affects 
aggressive tax planning and how much family firms differ in that specific matters in 
contrast with non-family firms.  
The structure of the following research is being demonstrated as follows. The 
first chapter reviews literature and hypothesis development. The second one the 
methodology research while in the third one the Empirical analysis is presented and 
the last chapter contains the conclusions, completing our research. 
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2. Literature review and Hypothesis Development 
In this part, I summarize and examine the published work on tax aggressiveness 
as well as agency theory which are connected directly. Moreover I develop my 
hypothesis connecting ownership structure (family and non-family firms) with tax 
aggressiveness as well as my second hypothesis regarding correlation with borrowing 
capacity. 
 
2.1 Tax Aggressiveness 
In literature, numerous researches have been made about tax aggressiveness 
as it is presented as a significant measure of tax behavior. For that reason we can find 
tax aggressiveness to be expressed as tax evasion or tax avoidance. The need to 
determine both tax aggressiveness and its parameters seem to have started in the 
early 2000nds when Shackelford and Selvin (2001) noticed that company’s 
management is a crucial factor to measure tax aggressiveness. Two years later, Rego’s 
(2003) research proved that firms which have less tax payout, seem to present a 
greater amount of cash flows at the end of the year. Scholes (2005) assumes that it is 
perfunctory to say that tax aggressive activities lead to maximize a company’s value, as 
potential costs arises of such ways of management behavior including non-tax costs. 
Some years later, Dyreng et al. (2008) mentions that avoiding taxes reveals all the 
dealing that affects directly a firm’s tax obligations, analyzing that occasion by any 
reason that can impact on the decline of company’s effective tax rate for a certain 
period of time. After all that research Chen et al (2010) gives a straight up definition 
for tax aggressiveness as downward management of taxable income via tax planning 
activities. Also Chen et al (2010) notice the potential risks of losing benefits that 
companies are about to face, by managing the level of tax aggressiveness, beyond  the 
cost of such actions. On the other hand Lisowsky, Robinshon and Scmidt (2010) 
capture tax avoidance actions as a consistent absence from legal tax planning through 
the use of offshore tax shelters.  
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2.1.1. Factors of Tax Aggressiveness 
The correlation of multiple company characteristics with tax aggressiveness has 
been studied by a lot of researchers trying to relate them in a way that safe 
conclusions can be draw. One of the first researches by Stickney and McGee (1982) 
support that capital intensity, debt and financing activities which causes changes in 
effective tax rates are more important factors than company’s size and abroad 
operations. While Gupta and Newberry (1997) say that firm’s assets and capital 
structure are linked with the effective tax rates. A firm’s size defines the level of 
effective tax rates says Rego (2003), analyzing that a company bigger in size should 
have higher effective tax rates than a small size company. Also a company with high 
profitability should present low effective tax rates. With that explanation Rego (2003) 
present why economies of scale exist for tax avoidance. One year later Slemrod (2004) 
mentions the fact of relationship conflict between shareholders and managers who are 
responsible for tax planning and can be influenced by that determinant as well as the 
adjustment to the tax authorities’ decisions for a specific year. One more determinant 
of tax aggressiveness which has been detected through literature is the adjustment to 
ownership structure responding to problems that can affect tax planning and causes 
wider government issues, Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Tao Chen and Chen Li (2017) 
investigate the information asymmetry between firms and its investors as a significant 
factor to reduce tax aggressiveness. Specifically they support that if information 
asymmetry decline then it would be more difficult for companies to hide their earnings 
via tax sheltering or complicate their financial structures and as a result aggressive tax 
planning will be reduced.  
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2.2 Consequences of Tax Aggressiveness 
According to Literature the effects of being tax aggressive could vary in a 
company’s finance both in a positive way and in a negative one. Undoubtedly the 
avoidance of paying taxes could lead to save money and as a result increase cash 
flows, which can be used in future investments or covering operations of an entity, 
Kourdoumpalou (2015). Moreover, benefits could arise between the relations of 
shareholders and managers as the last ones can benefit by bonuses or other benefits 
by making a desirable tax planning.  
In fact, numerous studies examine the direct connection between managers 
and tax aggressiveness, offering in each case o different angle. Phillips (2003) explains 
in his survey that after the imposition of taxes managers get rewards for their 
performance and that is combined with lower ETRs. That aspect examines also 
Slemrod (2004) by making a model to connect tax aggressiveness with remuneration 
packages of managers.  Desai and Dharmapala (2004, 2006) talk about rent-seeking 
and tax avoidance which regards to the maximization of company’s activities in a short 
period by the orders of shareholders, with the potential danger of penalties by tax 
authorities. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) claim that tax aggressiveness effects depend 
on the punishment of the management and to witch extent firm can overcome any 
potential penalty. Moreover, Lanis and Richarchon (2011) examines Corporate Social 
Responsibility principles as an influence parameter to tax aggressiveness via Board of 
Directors, as the outside (independent) directors tend to be more responsible to 
society needs. In that way they can make a positive impact to BoD decisions of taking 
part to tax aggressive strategies.  
2.3. Agency Theory 
One of the examined aspects that play an important role in tax aggressiveness 
phenomenon, as it is caused by managers’ behavior, is also the “Agency Theory” or the 
uttered “Agency conflict”. It is true that the specific topic have triggered the interest 
for research as it comes with questions regarding management control or corporate 
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governance issues and the results in the total management of a company within an 
economic year.  
   A clear definition for Agency Theory has been made by Barry M. Mitnik (2015) 
who supports that”the theory tries to understand the problems created when one 
party, the agent, is acting for another, the principal. Agency has two sides: The 
activities and problems of identifying and providing services of “acting for” (agent 
side), and the activities and problems of guiding and correcting agent actions (the 
principal side). Because all actions and corrections have costs, it often does not pay the 
principal (or the agent) to insist on, or provide, perfect agency causing lack of 
trustworthy behavior”. One other aspect of Agency Theory research is the angle of 
Vincent Kunst and Sjoerd Beugelsdijik (2018) who support that the already studies 
failed to give a clear answer on the agency’s theory validity, explaining thereafter that 
cultural behavior is one metric that can characterize and “count” the specific conflict. 
In their results they support that in the Anglo-Saxon region, awarding agents improves 
their performance, thus we should see the agency conflict as “regiocentric”. 
    However earlier research, Chen et al. (2010), studies the correlation of agency 
theory with tax aggressiveness in family and non-family firms as according to the 
research the presence of founding members in the company’s governance compile a 
tendency for agency conflict among shareholders than in non-family firms, affecting in 
that way the rise of the probability level to detect tax aggressiveness. One year later, 
Lanis and Richardson (2011) connects the tax aggressiveness with the synthesis of 
Board of Directors and by examing that assumption empirically he finds out that the 
presence of a greater number of Independent Directors decreases the aggressive 
behavior in tax planning. A more comprehensive opinion has been displayed by Tensie 
Steijevers & Mervi Neskanen (2014) who focus on the level of agency costs between 
management and ownership, as well as the separation of them and the information 
asymmetry that been caused by the different interests. The potential results are that 
with the presence of agency conflict, more tax aggressive behaviors occur and 
specifically in family firms except the financial gains the risks are more concentrating in 
social emotional which is mainly company’s reputation.  
(Greek Literature IF…)   
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2.4 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure of a company and specifically family and non-family 
companies is one of the parameters that is been examined in the literature regarding 
corporate ownership and how its composition influence aggressive tax planning 
situations.  
   As it is reported above, Chen et al. (2010) explains with sufficient words what is 
defined as family and non-family firms or how we can identify them and the reasons 
which lead to tax aggressive planning regarding invoking agency theory. Specifically, 
analyzes family firms as companies that founding members has a great amount of 
shares among shareholders or hold positions in top management. The existence and 
only of that factor can lead to tax avoidance as greater savings observed to great in 
order to benefit acknowledging that the risks for family companies are higher focusing 
on negative reputation.  Moreover Isakov and Wisskopf (2015) follow the same case 
saying that reputation of a family firm is influenced by the decision are made by the 
management and so the holding family has to protect the “name of the company” and 
considered it as a significant asset.  
    Greek evidence has proved that Greece is a country with a great number of 
SMEs companies among EU and most of them are family firms as well. As it is proved 
by Spyros Vasiliadis (2013) Greek family firms have lack of corporate governance and 
that leads to negatively transporting business from one generation to another, 
prolonging the agency conflict and substantially non-occupational and immoral 
behavior regarding the general and specifically tax planning of a company. On the 
other hand Koutoupis (2014) focuses on the Greek Law regulation in his research 
detecting a huge gap in ownership structure and the legal duties of shareholders and 
managers although the theoretically new legislation for corporate governance form 
(Law 3016/2002).In particular, that gap allows to apply business in a way that 
reporting is significant through accounting and auditing practices but yet it’s 
application is in a very early age, mainly through cultural behavior. 
   Overall, the literature proves that having a tax aggressive planning could be 
beneficial and it can be easily detected in family firms as non-family firms have 
managers that could face much higher risks. According to our research it is quite 
unclear if family firms are more tax aggressive than non-family. Therefore, we can 
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make our hypothesis as far as the previous literature review studying the relation 
between ownership structure (family and non-family firms) with tax aggressive 
behavior. So the examined hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: “Family firms expound a different level of tax aggressiveness in 
comparison to non-family firms”. 
2.4 Borrowing Capacity 
Prior studies have examined the influence of debt that a company holds to tax 
aggressive planning. Borrowing capacity can be defined by the amount of money that 
is available for a company to borrow based on the company’s current financial 
position. Lenders are also interested in analyzing borrowing capacity of a company. To 
translate borrowing capacity as a variable for later empirical analysis we consider 
Alexandros Sikalidis and Stergios Leventis (2016) research, as they use coverage ratio 
as borrowing capacity employed by financial expenses.  It is a fact that in literature 
there is a huge debate among borrowing capacity and tax aggressive behavior. Wilson 
(2009) attempts to explain the reasons of being sheltered in tax heavens create lower 
coverage ratios. One aspect of them is that by transporting revenues in tax heavens or 
making transactions in order to hide earnings the coverage ratio is getting lower as the 
EBIT in the end of the fiscal year is lower than the expected. Two years later, Rego and 
Wilson (2012) provide with evidence that reveals that companies with high leverage or 
coverage ratios are connected with lower Effective Tax Rates indicating high level of 
tax avoidance.  
Moreover, taking into consideration prior literature we can make an empirical 
assumption that “the level (high, low) of the coverage ratio of a firm has a direct 
association with the level (high, low) of firm’s tax aggressiveness”. Making that 
assumption we conclude to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between tax aggressiveness and ownership 
structure is more pronounced with higher borrowing capacity 
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3. Methodology Research and Design 
In this part I analyze the methodology of research indicating the examined 
samples, the variables as far as the definitions and the reasons that are been chosen. 
3.1. Sample 
To launch the specific research I used as a sample publically listed companies 
by the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) covering a five year period, from 2013 to 2017. 
Although ASE is a small stock exchange and has a low number of listed firms compared 
with the European Union average (Dasilas and Leventis 2010) it is a great occasion to 
examine the specific topic in Greece during the financial crisis period. Main Market of 
ASE in 2004 had listed about 350 companies while in 2018 190 in Security Market 
represented only with 112 stocks. The existence of an Alternative Market also is 
observed where just 12 companies are trade their stocks (helex.gr). 
   The sample that I used for my research consists of 190 companies of the Main 
Market from all categories of industries as it is necessary to categorize and separate 
family and non-family firms in a specific sample. The evidence of primary literature 
proved that it is useful to exclude companies from banking, insurance and brokerage 
sector which have special characteristics and cannot be compared with companies of 
other industries as well as there is not data availability. Regarding family ownership as 
one of the variables for my research I extract data from ASE and companies websites 
as well. Moreover Amadeus database has been used to extract the relevant data for 
our variables as ROA, PPE, Intangible Assets and have been used directly, thus data 
that were crucial to the calculation of specific ratios as ETR, LEVERAGE, MB wherever it 
was necessary. Also data from companies websites were extracted in order to 
complete missing values. 
3.2. Dependent Variable 
According to my research corporate tax aggressiveness should be used as 
dependent variable. Corporate tax aggressiveness counts numerous measures 
according to literature such as effective tax rate, cash effective tax rate, book tax 
differences, unrecognized tax differences and others. Although the great number of 
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measures Effective Tax Rate (ETR) has been chosen as a measurement for the purpose 
of this dissertation. The specific selection has been done because of data availability 
thus that this ratio illustrates a close to Greek economy reality. A clear explanation of 
the ETR can be provided by International Accounting Standards (IAS) 12 about Income 
Tax Regulations and present it as the average rate at which a corporation is taxed as 
far as the average rate at which its pretax profits are been taxed. ETR is calculated by 
dividing total tax expenses to the pre-tax income and the used formula is:  
According to bibliography this measure will help us to prove that the level of 
tax aggressiveness differs from company to company depending on the level 
percentage level of ETR. Chen et al (2010) clarifies that ETR reflects aggressive tax 
planning through permanent book-tax differences and that firms which are more tax 
aggressive have lower ETR than other firms. 
3.3. Independent Variable 
As an independent variable i assume the ownership structure. Primary 
literature proved that ownership structure is an aspect that influence aggressive tax 
planning.  Bauweraerts (2013) supports that in order to characterize a corporation as a 
family firm, it needs to fulfill certain criteria. According to that fact, the criterion that I 
separate family from non-family firms is the proportion of stocks owned directly by 
founding members should be equal or bigger than 10% of equity shares of voting 
rights. Effectively, the specific classification gives us a clear illustration of the number 
of family and non-family firms in our sample. 
3.4. Control Variables 
To illustrate the full model we used control variables as form studies indicate. 
Specifically control variables like debt, profits, liquidity and size of a firm can affect the 
size and range of tax liabilities. For the purpose of this dissertation the control 
variables that been selected after the research in order to be closer to greek financial 
reality are ,as we will indicate later in Model Specification section, by order ROA, 
Leverage, Coverage, Cash, MB, PPE and INTANG. ROA is the Return on Assets ratio 
which indicates profitability of a company for a certain period of time and its related to 
Total Assets, thus its measurement arises from operating income lagged to total 
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assets, Chen et al. (2010). Leverage and Coverage are two solvency ratios and their 
measurement illustrates the level of debt in the capital structure of a company and the 
correspondence to its liabilities as well as the evaluation of its cash flows to cover 
interests and operating  expenses. In particular, Leverage is a measure of Long-Term 
Debt to total Assets which indicates how much capital comes in form of Debt, while 
Coverage points out the ability of a company to meet the financial obligations to its 
lenders and is been measured as the ratio of Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) 
to Interest expenses. For the purpose of calculating the liquidity for our sample Cash 
ratio has been used. Cash ratio is a metric for a company to measure its short-term 
obligations dividing Cash and Cash Equivalents to Current Liabilities. Concerning the 
growth metric for the sample I used MB or market-to-book value ratio which is a 
financial metric to evaluate a company’s current market value relative to its book value 
and is calculated by dividing market value of equity to book value of equity. Regarding 
PPE and INTANG control variables corresponding to Property, Plant and Equipment 
and Intangible Assets its, thus they are both scaled by lagged assets. PPE is referred to 
tangible assets expected to generate financial benefit for a period no more than a year 
and as the IAS 16 describes their accounting treatment they are characterized at the 
end of a fiscal year as depreciation expenses for tax mainly purposes. As far as INTANG 
are referring mainly in patents and trademarks and the use of that variable has been 
done in order to control differential book and tax treatments of them, Chen et al. 
(2010). Finally, we include in our model Year Dummies for the purpose of controlling 
fixed year effects of corporate tax aggressiveness by characterizing them as 1 if Year 
Dummies are fall in a specific year and 0 if not. 
3.5. Model Specifications 
To examine the relation between the ownership structure (family and non-
family firms) and tax aggressiveness, we followed a regression model by Chen et al 
(2010) as it is relatively the most integrated one through literature about the specific 
topic with more than two variable parameters. The estimation of our regression model 
for our first hypothesis is: 
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TaxAggi,t = αi + β1FAMILYi,t+ β2ROAi,t+ β3LEVERAGEi,t+ β4CASHi,t+ β5ΜΒi,t+ β6PPEi,t+ 
β7INTANGi,t+ year dummies + εit  
 
The subscripts i and t correspond to company and year of incorporation 
respectively. While α is the constant term. Also, β1 to β7 are slopes and ε is the 
disturbance term of the regression model. Meantime TaxAgg is the tax aggressiveness 
measure expressed as ETR (dependent variable).  
Moreover, for the purpose of the analysis of our second hypothesis regarding 
borrowing capacity and tax aggressiveness we apply the same regression model adding 
the new control variable COVERAGE:  
 
TaxAggi,t = αi + β1FAMILYi,t + β2ROAi,t + β3LEVERAGEi,t+ β4CASHi,t+ β5ΜΒi,t+ β6PPEi,t+ 
β7INTANGi,t+ β8COVERAGEi,t + year dummies + εit  
 
To present our data analysis we used panel data which use both time series and 
cross-sectional elements. In this way panel data conclude information both for time 
and space. Brooks (2014) provide us knowledge about the significance of panel data 
and the advantages of their use. At first, it is easier to analyze a wide range of issues 
and be able to deal with more complex problems rather than would be possible with 
time series or cross sectional alone. Second, if we need to examine how variables or 
the relationships between them, change over time, using either series data or cross-
sectional data we would face problems. By using pure time series data we would often 
require a long run of data nothing more than to get an adequate number of 
observations to be able to conduct a significant hypothesis tests. With the combination 
of cross-sectional and time series data, we can increase the number of degrees of 
freedom, and therefore the force of the test, by using information on the behavior of a 
large number of entities at the same time. The extra variation presented by combing 
the data in this way can also help to make lee harm from the problems of 
multicollinearity that may occurs if time series are modeled individually. Third by 
designing the model in a suitable way, we can eliminate the impact of certain forms of 
omitted variables bias in regression results. 
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From the above it is theoretically logical to make our decision of using panel 
data for 190 companies during 2013 to 2017. The method of panel data analysis is the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) which requires to take each vertical distance from the 
point to the line of our regression model, afterwards squaring it anf then minimizing 
the total sum of the areas of squares. 
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4. Empirical Analysis and Results 
In this section, research of the empirical analysis is presented. Tables with 
descriptive statistics, autocorrelation matrix and OLS regression results is provided and 
analyzed to reach our conclusions. 
 
4.1. Empirical Analysis 
Beginning our empirical analysis we feel the need to note one more time the 
meaning of its variable as well as the way they are measured. ETR is the Effective Tax 
Rate, is our dependent variable and a tax aggressiveness measure thus is calculated by 
Total Tax Expenses over Pretax Income (EBIT); FAMILY is the Family ownership which 
indicator is 1 if its Family and 0 if its non-family company and our benchmark as it is 
discussed above was that shareholders equity should be equal or greater than 10% of 
the total holding shares; ROA is the ratio of Net Income to total assets; LEVERAGE, 
long-term debt to total assets ratio; CASH, cash and cash equivalents to total assets 
ratio; MB, market to book value ratio; PPE, property plant and equipment scalled by 
lagged assets; INTANG, intangible assets scaled by total assets; SIZE, the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization; COVERAGE, ratio of EBITDA over interest paid. 
The analysis of descriptive statistics provides us with quantitative information 
about the overall collection of our features by summarizing them. It is not an indicator 
for our analysis to extract a conclusion or result; however it is important to notice 
them in order to develop a basis for our later analysis. In that point I would like to 
notice that except the two tables (Table 1 and 11) that is been presented in that 
section, there are detailed tables for every result of this analysis separately in 
Appendix section. 
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             Table 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 
Acknowledging what descriptive statistics are we can notice that in Table 1 the 
minimum (min), mean and maximum (max) values of our variables. The dependent 
variable ETR has a mean value of approximately 8,51 and standard deviation of 158,67, 
while its min value is -1700.89 and max 2345.55. The independent variable FAMILY has 
a mean value of 0,65 (65%) and standard deviation of 0,47. Regarding the Control 
Variables 1.ROA, 2.LEVERAGE, 3.CASH, 4.MB, 5.PPE , 6.INTANG, 7.SIZE AND 
8.COVERAGE we have respectively mean values (standard deviations) of 1. -1.09 (11,9), 
2. 50,04 (173), 3. 27,05 (129,16), 4. 6,93 (30,67), 5. 33061,48 (118927,5),6. 45661,43 
(370606,8),7. 14395,1 (49383,07),8. 80,71 (777,32). Finally we should mention the min 
and max values to complete our report regarding summary statistics ROA has a min of 
-71,65 and a max of 69,82, LEVERAGE’s min 0 and max 2700, CASH’s min is 0,005 and 
max 3133,32, MB’s min is -250 and max 439,02, PPE’s min is 61,8 and max 1510890, 
INTANG’s min is 1 and max is 1.03m approximately, SIZE min is 5 and max 563600 and 
COVERAGE’s min is -621,614 and max 14616.16. Moreover it is notable that the 
skewness of all variables ranges from -0,20 to 22.67 and that fact can indicate that 
most of them have high positive skewness, motivating us to investigate if the 
distribution of data derives from a normal distribution or not.    
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                                           [See Table 2] 
 
For that reason we test the normality hypothesis in Table 2 (Appendix) for the 
continuous variables of interest, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality has been 
utilized. It has been revealed that none of them are normally distributed. Thus, a 
logarithmic transformation [ ln(X) ] to variables (with no negative values) has been 
applied. For the variables with negative values (ETR, ROA, LEVERAGE, COVERAGE) the 
linear transformation ln[Y+1-Minimum value of (Y)], where Y is the name of the 
aforementioned variables, has been calculated and since the transformation is linear, 
this doesn’t affect the contribution of the variables to the regression model. The above 
mentioned procedure has been applied in order to stabilize the large variance 
observed (due to outliers and not normally distribution of the variables). Also, the 
transformed values of the not correlated variables whether produced one or two 
statistical significant results between each other and they have been entered into the 
model. 
 
                                           [See Table 3] 
 
Table 3 presents Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The correlation granted 
reveals that the SIZE variable is correlated statistically significant with all the six 
independent variables (p<0.01 for all of them and LN_LEVERAGE p=0.027) except 
LN_COVERAGE. So, LN_SIZE has been excluded from the multiple regression analysis 
afterwards, since it provides the same information by the rest of the variables 
considered to the model. So regarding LN_ETR as a dependent variable, LN_ROA, 
LN_LEVERAGE, LN_INTANG, LN_MB, LN_PPE, LN_CASH, LN_COVERAGE have been 
utilized as independent variables for the multivariate linear regression model. As we 
can see the only “reactions” that are observed are between CASH and LEVERAGE with 
a 0,2638 coefficient. MB variable has a positive relation coefficient with a 0,3642 and 
0,2541 LEVERAGE and CASH respectively. Finally PPE presents positive coefficients with 
LEVERAGE (0,1462) and MB (0,1314). 
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 The next step in our empirical analysis illustrates the results of the regressions 
where we used 2 models in order to serve our Hypotheses. The first one with ETR as 
dependent variable and Family ownership as independent variable. The second one is 
also the same and includes as control variable COVERAGE. Afterwards, as we have said 
above, we log our variables in order to have a better normal distribution and we run 
regressions for each year to extract the best result, as well as two regressions 
expressing our dependent variable ETR as if is only for family firms and one for non-
family. The coefficients of our analysis are estimated with ordinary least squares 
method (OLS) as illustrated below. 
 
                                             [See Table 4 & 5] 
 
At first as we can see by table 4 that the independent variable FAMILY has a 
coefficient of 0,0088 and a p-value of 0,648 which assumes that is statistically 
insignificant, as the proper level of p-value needs to be close to 5%. Although, we can 
connect the FAMILY variable with tax aggressiveness as it could give us the assumption 
that ownership structure cannot prove the level of tax aggressiveness when it depends 
from ETR. So we cannot prove our hypothesis that family firms are more tax aggressive 
than non-family firms as the dependent variable ETR does not correlate with FAMILY 
variable. The same negative relation we meet with the rest control variables as both 
coefficients and p-value meet a great distance of being characterized as statistically 
significant. A priori, we cannot connect those variables in a way that will bring us a 
sufficient result, thus further research should be done to discover the control variables 
that can be connected with ETR.  
The second model of this dissertation is located in Table 5 and is a same model 
consistently with the previous one, including COVERAGE variable. Adding variable 
COVERAGE to investigate the relation with ETR combined with family structure we can 
observe again a negative relation between the last two variables. The FAMILY variable 
tends to increase as the coefficient it’s about 0,0086 and the p-value is 0,658 and again 
we have a negative result. Again we meet the same assumption as in our first model 
where a possible positive (negative) change of the dependent variable ETR will 
influence tax aggressiveness level. 
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                                      [See Table 6 to 10] 
 
Tables 6 to 10 represent our regression analysis for each year respectively from 
2013 to 2017. We feel the need to present such an analysis for the reason that we 
observed results that is noteworthy. In Table 6 (177 obs, 2013) the illustration of the 
model follows the same path as for all years, but the proportion of variance (R-
squared) is about 5%, so we can understand that our sample begin to have a statistical 
interest regarding the effect of our independent variable FAMILY on the dependent 
one ETR. Table 7 (174 obs, 2014) may defer among the others as is the first one to 
present significant results. Again we meet the same negative effect of FAMILY (family 
ownership) to ETR but know control variable ROA has a coefficient of -0,052 and a p-
value of 0,015 which indicates a positive relation with ETR. That means that for every 
unit that ETR increases variable ROA decreases for -19,1 units and firms become more 
tax aggressive with the decrease of independent variable ROA. Furthermore, it is 
observed that coefficient of control variable PPE is positive and statistically significant 
as its p-value is close to 5% (0,0487) and could have a positive effect to the relation 
with the ETR. In table 8 (174 obs, 2015) and in table 10 (169 obs, 2017) we do not find 
significant evidence to mention except from the negative coefficient for independent 
variable FAMILY -0,028 for 2015 and -0,033 for 2017. In table 9 (174 obs, 2016) the 
only variable that is notable to comment is the ROA variable with a coefficient of 0,048 
and a p-value of 0,029 (2,9) which is close to be statistically significant to 5%. In 
contrast with 2014 relation of ROA variable to ETR now we observe a positive one 
which indicates the increase of ROA for every unit incrase of ETR while firm’s tax 
aggressiveness decrease. 
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                          Table 11: OLS Regression Results 
                     
 
Table 11 (570 obs, 2013-2017, Family firms) illustrates our only model that 
indicates a statistically fairly good fit (Prob > F = 0.042 < 0.050), regarding the model 
for companies who belong to families. R-squared (R2) indicator for the model is only 
2.28% which means a very low prediction capacity of the variance observed by the 
model. Variables that are significant for this model are LN_MB with p-value of 0,053 
(marginally significant) and LN_PPE with p-value of 0,025 which indicates that for 
Family firms as a benchmark, the control variables MB and PPE have a negative and a 
positive benchmark .That means that MB is been affected negatively by ETR when it 
increases as it has a negative coefficient of – 0,0047, same time PPE presents a positive 
relation with the increase of ETR with a coefficient of 0,0063. So we can assume that 
when ETR increases then we have a negative effect on the MB variable which means 
that as effective tax rate increases then we have a decrease in market-book value. On 
the other hand, PPE variable increases with the same rate of ETR. A possible 
explanation for that phenomenon is that when effective tax rate increases we have the 
same time a possible increase in depreciation and amortization of the firm’s assets. 
Finally,  all other variables didn’t reach the statistically significant level set (5%), 
meaning that we accept the H0 for that coefficients for the equation (bi) is zero, where 
i represents the rest of the not statistically significant variables entered into the model. 
Moreover we may assume that further research should be provided to find the 
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variables that could correlate directly with ETR and provide solid evidence for our 
investigation. 
                                                [See Table 12] 
 
Finally in Table 12 (298 obs, 2013-2017, non-family firms) we terminate our 
research by presenting the regression analysis for non-family firms as a benchmark. 
The analysis has similar characteristics as the previous one and the findings proved 
that all variables ROA, LEVERAGE, CASH, MB, PPE, INTANG has not a significant 
correlation with the dependent variable ETR. R-squared 2,34% indicates a low 
prediction capacity, but the results could be characterized more notable from our very 
first model (Table 1 & 2). 
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Conclusions 
This dissertation has made an attempt to investigate the impacts of family and 
non-family firms structure to tax aggressiveness. We defined as family firms as 
companies where at least one member of the founding family has shares in a 
proportion equal or greater of 10% of the total shares. As measurement for tax 
aggressiveness, the dependent variable we used the Effective Tax Rate. To examine 
our second hypothesis we used coverage ratio to express borrowing capacity. Among 
our research we tried to extract significant evidence to illustrate the interaction of this 
factors between them. In order to make that research we used panel data and we 
selected a sample of 190 companies listed in ASE for a five year period (2013-2017) 
witch match to 950 observations. Consequently, our sample did not gave us the 
expected outcome and through detailed statistical analysis we conclude in a sample of 
570 observations with only family firms. The empirical analysis proved that family 
ownership affects the level of tax aggressiveness. As far as the impacts of borrowing 
capacity on tax aggressiveness we tried to find out the determinants under which 
there is an interaction between them.  
Existing literature supports that there is two directions through the effects of 
family companies to corporate tax aggressiveness. The first one states that family firms 
present high level of tax avoidance while the other one that controlling families try to 
be less tax aggressive due to potential costs. Assuming that, our research proved that 
Greek family companies are more tax aggressive than non-family companies and can 
be related to existing literature. However our findings in contrast with the other 
variables proved that are insignificant and that we can’t use them for safe conclusions.  
As far as our second hypothesis for borrowing capacity and tax aggressiveness we can 
conclude that firm’s ability to pay its liabilities to its lenders increases as ETR increases 
so we cannot relate Coverage ratio with a  dependent variable like Effective Tax Rate.  
My work adds to the bibliography since, as far as I know, similar topic has not 
been examined through the specific period 2013-2017 for Greece. I try to critically 
connect Tax Aggressiveness with Ownership structure for Greek public  listed  firms 
and that connection contributes to the consistently discussed issue about tax 
avoidance and how this is been affected by companies’ ownership. The extracted 
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results may not be ideal for conclusions but their originality is undoubted and they can 
be used for future research.    
Although, this research has been done with as much possible accuracy, we feel 
the need to mention that certain limitations exist. First of all compared to other 
researches the sample used is been represented by firms incorporating in one country. 
Another limitation is the relatively small range of the sample size. It is a fact that in a 
country like Greece witch faces financial difficulties due to economic crisis, many listed 
companies have stopped trading their stocks or they are under suspension in the trade 
market. As well as companies that are listed may not be a representative sample of a 
specific industry in Greece. Moreover, another limitation that we have detected is that 
our control variables have been already used in a couple of studies, thus may not be 
the proper ones to capture their variance in a region with financial disclosure like 
Greece. Also we may take into consideration the fact that family ownership in Greece 
is in a quite high level and could be an indicator to use or research for another 
variables that can define properly corporate ownership. One more limitation that has 
been detected is that we used as measure for tax aggressiveness only the Effective Tax 
Rate (ETR).  
As we can assume from our limitations there is quite a lot of space for further 
research. Possible alternatives to test in the future in order to reach a good point of 
measurement could be a larger sample like listed and unlisted companies from same 
industries in as well as a wider period of time. A proper one for the case of Greece 
could be a period before financial crisis and after. Also future research could combine 
and test companies incorporating in Europe and Greece. As far as ownership structure 
we should test more categories of ownership like government, institutional etc.   
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Appendix 
Table 1: Detailed Descriptive Statistics  
 
summarize ETR- SIZE, detail 
 ETR 
Percentiles Smallest 
1%    -395.2299 -1700.892 
5%    -71.25083 -1156.5 
10%    -26.92025 -1133.836 Obs 950 
25%    -2.400804 -1030.975 Sum of Wgt. 950 
50%     8.491398  Mean 8.513827 
 Largest Std. Dev. 158.676 
75%     22.29128 1065.678 
90%     45.97676 1120.931 Variance 25178.08 
95%     94.93423 1275.406 Skewness 1.905559 
99%     475.8667 2345.558 Kurtosis 85.60348 
 
 ROA 
Percentiles Smallest 
1%       -39.71 -71.65 
5%       -20.29 -67.48 
10%        -11.7 -54.43 Obs 950 
25%        -5.17 -46.42 Sum of Wgt. 950 
50%        -.375  Mean -1.092156 
 Largest Std. Dev. 11.9077 
75%         3.13 46.28 
90%        8.815 47.48   Variance 141.7933 
95%        14.83 48.93   Skewness -.1991192 
99%        39.08 69.82   Kurtosis 9.955651 
 
 LEVERAGE 
Percentiles Smallest 
1%            0 0 
5%     .0041176 0 
10%     .3958501 0 Obs 950 
25%     2.898551 0 Sum of Wgt. 950 
50%         12.5  Mean 50.04464 
 Largest Std. Dev. 173.0046 
75%     38.46154 1600 
90%     86.68587 1744.444 Variance 29930.59 
95%          168 2580.645 Skewness 10.1348 
99%          775 2700    Kurtosis 130.0257 
 
 CASH 
Percentiles Smallest 
1%      .043101 .0052006 
5%     .2457143 .0083109 
10%     .4938448 .010101 Obs 950 
25%     1.454902 .0123688 Sum of Wgt. 950 
50%     5.131974  Mean 27.05945 
 Largest Std. Dev. 129.1662 
75%     15.12085 811.2474 
90%     36.46355 815.125 Variance 16683.9 
95%     95.69286 1178.889 Skewness 16.54048 
99%      460.175 3133.32 Kurtosis 364.8948 
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 MB 
Percentiles Smallest 
1%      -24.375 -250 
5%    -1.666667 -150 
10%     .0070678 -146.6667 Obs 950 
25%     .3206997 -136.9118 Sum of Wgt. 950 
 
50%     1.463263  Mean 6.935311 
 Largest Std. Dev. 30.67584 
75%     5.593363 198.75 
90%     16.29362 236.3158 Variance 941.0069 
95%        31.25 311.25  Skewness 4.825983 
99%     148.2759 439.0244 Kurtosis 69.97662 
 
 COVERAGE 
Percentiles Smallest 
1%    -73.27491 -621.614 
5%    -7.181505 -280.0772 
10%     -2.57266 -277.0665 Obs 950 
25%     .0591332 -259.4871 Sum of Wgt. 950 
 
50%     1.860464  Mean 80.71293 
 Largest Std. Dev. 777.3216 
75%     6.561612 5818.56 
90%     23.60152 8070    Variance 604228.9 
95%     65.07543 13029   Skewness 14.10664 
99%     2416.564 14616.16 Kurtosis 229.1135 
 
 PPE  
Percentiles Smallest 
1%     69.82875 61.8 
5%        678.1 61.8 
10%     976.2558 61.8 Obs 950 
25%     1454.789 65.0115 Sum of Wgt. 950 
 
50%     5701.052  Mean 33061.48 
 Largest Std. Dev. 118927.5 
75%      24467.7 1428180 
90%     54938.69 1441510 Variance 1.41e+10 
95%     135576.9 1441520 Skewness 9.490998 
99%     449412.4 1510890 Kurtosis 108.0026 
 
 INTANG 
Percentiles Smallest 
1%            1 1 
5%            1 1 
10%            4 1 Obs 950 
25%           27 1 Sum of Wgt. 950 
 
50%          430  Mean 45661.43 
 Largest Std. Dev. 370606.8 
75%         4050 1488700 
90%      36097.5 1582800 Variance 1.37e+11 
95%       127235 1649500 Skewness 22.6754 
99%      1218543 1.03e+07 Kurtosis 610.8306 
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 SIZE  
Percentiles Smallest 
1%           30 5 
5%           91 6 
10%          100 7 Obs 950 
25%          200 10 Sum of Wgt. 950 
 
50%          800  Mean 14395.1 
 Largest Std. Dev. 49383.07 
75%         4300 446000 
90%        31850 452800  Variance 2.44e+09 
95%        74600 473900  Skewness 6.29911 
99%       267900 563600  Kurtosis 51.43074 
 
 
 
Table 2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
 
ksmirnov ROA = ROA 
 
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution 
ROA 
 
Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
---------------------------------------------- 
ROA:               71.6511    0.000 
Cumulative:       -68.8211    0.000 
Combined K-S:      71.6511    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in dataset;  
there are 797 unique values out of 950 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov ETR = ETR 
 
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution 
ETR 
 
Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
---------------------------------------------- 
ETR:               1.7e+03    0.000 
Cumulative:       -2.3e+03    0.000 
Combined K-S:      2.3e+03    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in dataset;  
there are 916 unique values out of 950 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov LEVERAGE = LEVERAGE 
 
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution 
LEVERAGE 
 
Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
---------------------------------------------- 
LEVERAGE:           0.0474    0.014 
Cumulative:       -2.7e+03    0.000 
Combined K-S:      2.7e+03    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in dataset;  
there are 739 unique values out of 950 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov SIZE = SIZE 
 
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution 
SIZE 
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Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
---------------------------------------------- 
SIZE:              -4.9989    0.000 
Cumulative:       -5.6e+05    0.000 
Combined K-S:      5.6e+05    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in dataset;  
there are 273 unique values out of 950 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov INTANG = INTANG 
 
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution 
INTANG 
 
Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
---------------------------------------------- 
INTANG:            -0.9221    0.000 
Cumulative:       -1.0e+07    0.000 
Combined K-S:      1.0e+07    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in dataset;  
there are 623 unique values out of 950 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov MB = MB 
 
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution 
MB 
 
Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
---------------------------------------------- 
MB:               250.0011    0.000 
Cumulative:       -4.4e+02    0.000 
Combined K-S:     438.0254    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in dataset;  
there are 790 unique values out of 950 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov PPE = PPE 
 
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution 
PPE 
 
Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
---------------------------------------------- 
PPE:              -61.7968    0.000 
Cumulative:       -1.5e+06    0.000 
Combined K-S:      1.5e+06    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in dataset;  
there are 843 unique values out of 950 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov CASH = CASH 
 
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution 
CASH 
 
Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
---------------------------------------------- 
CASH:              -0.0041    0.968 
Cumulative:       -3.1e+03    0.000 
Combined K-S:      3.1e+03    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in dataset;  
there are 949 unique values out of 950 observations. 
 
. ksmirnov COVERAGE = COVERAGE 
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One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against theoretical distribution 
COVERAGE 
 
Smaller group       D       P-value  Corrected 
---------------------------------------------- 
COVERAGE:         621.6150    0.000 
Cumulative:       -1.5e+04    0.000 
Combined K-S:      1.5e+04    0.000      0.000 
 
Note: ties exist in dataset;  
there are 941 unique values out of 950 observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 : Pearson’s correlations  (r, p, N) – statistically significant correlations are only 
displayed 
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. 
              
                    950      950
                 0.0000
     LN_SIZE     0.4603*  1.0000 
              
                    950
              
   LN_INTANG     1.0000 
                                
               LN_INT~G  LN_SIZE
              
                             950      950      950      868               950
                          0.0063   0.0278   0.0046   0.0000            0.0000
     LN_SIZE              0.1215*  0.1089   0.1241*  0.5967*           0.5046*
              
                                                        868               950
                                                     0.0318            0.0000
   LN_INTANG                                         0.1127            0.4130*
              
                                      950               868               950
                                   0.0002            0.0037         
      LN_PPE                       0.1462*           0.1314*           1.0000 
              
                                                                 950
                                                           
 LN_COVERAGE                                                  1.0000 
              
                                      868      868      868
                                   0.0000   0.0000
       LN_MB                       0.3642*  0.2541*  1.0000 
              
                                      950      950
                                   0.0000
     LN_CASH                       0.2638*  1.0000 
              
                                      950
                                
 LN_LEVERAGE                       1.0000 
              
                             950
                       
      LN_ROA              1.0000 
              
                    950
              
      LN_ETR     1.0000 
                                                                             
                 LN_ETR   LN_ROA LN_LEV~E  LN_CASH    LN_MB LN_COV~E   LN_PPE
. pwcorr LN_ETR LN_ROA LN_LEVERAGE LN_CASH LN_MB LN_COVERAGE LN_PPE LN_INTANG LN_SIZE, obs sig print(5) star(1) bonferroni
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Regression Models 
 
Table 4 
 
 regress LN_ETR FAMILY LN_ROA LN_LEVERAGE LN_CASH LN_MB LN_COVERAGE LN_PPE 
LN_INTANG 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     868 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  8,   859) =    0.96 
       Model |  .559920452     8  .069990056           Prob > F      =  0.4687 
    Residual |  62.8392403   859  .073153947           R-squared     =  0.0088 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0004 
       Total |  63.3991608   867  .073124753           Root MSE      =  .27047 
 
      LN_ETR |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+--- 
      FAMILY |   .0086338     .01948     0.44   0.658                 .0151686 
      LN_ROA |   -.005967   .0378037    -0.16   0.875                -.0054126 
 LN_LEVERAGE |   .0039797   .0077444     0.51   0.607                 .0195781 
     LN_CASH |  -.0069555   .0053967    -1.29   0.198                -.0462289 
       LN_MB |   .0055268    .005148     1.07   0.283                 .0403617 
 LN_COVERAGE |   .0057348   .0275228     0.21   0.835                 .0071603 
      LN_PPE |   .0027803   .0057396     0.48   0.628                 .0185393 
   LN_INTANG |    .004554   .0029531     1.54   0.123                 .0584848 
       _cons |   7.361044   .2390068    30.80   0.000                        . 
----------------- 
 
Table 5 
. regress LN_ETR FAMILY LN_ROA LN_LEVERAGE LN_CASH LN_MB LN_PPE LN_INTANG 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     868 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   860) =    1.09 
       Model |  .556744354     7  .079534908           Prob > F      =  0.3685 
    Residual |  62.8424164   860  .073072577           R-squared     =  0.0088 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0007 
       Total |  63.3991608   867  .073124753           Root MSE      =  .27032 
 
      LN_ETR |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+--- 
      FAMILY |   .0088759   .0194345     0.46   0.648                  .015594 
      LN_ROA |  -.0057596   .0377696    -0.15   0.879                -.0052245 
 LN_LEVERAGE |   .0040849   .0077237     0.53   0.597                 .0200956 
     LN_CASH |  -.0068734   .0053794    -1.28   0.202                -.0456835 
       LN_MB |   .0054252    .005122     1.06   0.290                 .0396197 
      LN_PPE |   .0027444   .0057338     0.48   0.632                 .0182997 
   LN_INTANG |    .004591   .0029461     1.56   0.120                 .0589603 
       _cons |   7.396866   .1659488    44.57   0.000                        . 
 
Table 6 
 
. regress LN_ETR FAMILY LN_ROA LN_LEVERAGE LN_CASH LN_MB LN_PPE LN_INTANG if 
YEAR ==2013 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     177 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   169) =    1.34 
       Model |  3.00951444     7  .429930635           Prob > F      =  0.2340 
    Residual |  54.1966129   169  .320690017           R-squared     =  0.0526 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0134 
       Total |  57.2061274   176  .325034815           Root MSE      =  .56629 
 
      LN_ETR |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+--- 
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      FAMILY |   .0712852   .0903518     0.79   0.431                 .0600364 
      LN_ROA |  -.0291035   .1048568    -0.28   0.782                 -.021048 
 LN_LEVERAGE |  -.0041656   .0335293    -0.12   0.901                -.0104718 
     LN_CASH |  -.0438539   .0267883    -1.64   0.103                -.1272248 
       LN_MB |   .0510746   .0270985     1.88   0.061                 .1549768 
      LN_PPE |  -.0011507   .0256078    -0.04   0.964                -.0036559 
   LN_INTANG |   .0203281    .013608     1.49   0.137                 .1237194 
       _cons |   7.409825   .4810218    15.40   0.000                        . 
 
Table 7 
 
. regress LN_ETR FAMILY LN_ROA LN_LEVERAGE LN_CASH LN_MB LN_PPE LN_INTANG if 
YEAR ==2014 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     174 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   166) =    1.89 
       Model |  .023865948     7  .003409421           Prob > F      =  0.0748 
    Residual |  .300161352   166  .001808201           R-squared     =  0.0737 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0346 
       Total |    .3240273   173   .00187299           Root MSE      =  .04252 
 
      LN_ETR |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+--- 
      FAMILY |   .0016752   .0068159     0.25   0.806                 .0186561 
      LN_ROA |  -.0524816   .0213966    -2.45   0.015                -.1910602 
 LN_LEVERAGE |  -.0039932   .0027523    -1.45   0.149                -.1254625 
     LN_CASH |   .0010473   .0018446     0.57   0.571                 .0445536 
       LN_MB |  -.0002611    .001836    -0.14   0.887                -.0118321 
      LN_PPE |    .004069    .002031     2.00   0.047                 .1667322 
   LN_INTANG |   .0007169   .0010286     0.70   0.487                 .0568927 
 
Table 8 
 
regress LN_ETR FAMILY LN_ROA LN_LEVERAGE LN_CASH LN_MB LN_PPE LN_INTANG if YEAR 
==2015 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     174 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   166) =    0.60 
       Model |  .068843549     7  .009834793           Prob > F      =  0.7590 
    Residual |   2.7413736   166  .016514299           R-squared     =  0.0245 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0166 
       Total |  2.81021715   173   .01624403           Root MSE      =  .12851 
 
      LN_ETR |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+--- 
      FAMILY |  -.0281164   .0207732    -1.35   0.178                -.1051581 
      LN_ROA |   .0053875   .0502918     0.11   0.915                 .0084242 
 LN_LEVERAGE |   .0080598   .0087344     0.92   0.357                 .0815754 
     LN_CASH |  -.0020892   .0055034    -0.38   0.705                -.0318104 
       LN_MB |  -.0020963   .0054695    -0.38   0.702                -.0329459 
      LN_PPE |   .0000941   .0065907     0.01   0.989                 .0013177 
   LN_INTANG |    .002492   .0033084     0.75   0.452                 .0669664 
       _cons |   7.407386   .2129163    34.79   0.000                         
 
Table 9 
 
regress LN_ETR FAMILY LN_ROA LN_LEVERAGE LN_CASH LN_MB LN_PPE LN_INTANG if YEAR 
==2016 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     174 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   166) =    1.66 
       Model |  .032813003     7  .004687572           Prob > F      =  0.1218 
    Residual |  .468384218   166  .002821592           R-squared     =  0.0655 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0261 
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       Total |  .501197221   173  .002897094           Root MSE      =  .05312 
 
      LN_ETR |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+--- 
      FAMILY |  -.0033086   .0086421    -0.38   0.702                -.0288006 
      LN_ROA |   .0487121   .0221179     2.20   0.029                 .1662405 
 LN_LEVERAGE |   .0031141   .0035014     0.89   0.375                 .0744186 
     LN_CASH |   .0017721   .0023655     0.75   0.455                 .0590636 
       LN_MB |  -.0013682   .0021372    -0.64   0.523                -.0519798 
      LN_PPE |   .0038308   .0024322     1.58   0.117                 .1290088 
   LN_INTANG |   .0003125   .0012625     0.25   0.805                 .0203392 
       _cons |   7.189445   .0968988    74.20   0.000                        . 
 
Table 10 
 
regress LN_ETR FAMILY LN_ROA LN_LEVERAGE LN_CASH LN_MB LN_PPE LN_INTANG if YEAR 
==2017 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     169 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   161) =    0.84 
       Model |  .085305664     7  .012186523           Prob > F      =  0.5577 
    Residual |  2.34256425   161  .014550088           R-squared     =  0.0351 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0068 
       Total |  2.42786991   168  .014451607           Root MSE      =  .12062 
 
      LN_ETR |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+--- 
      FAMILY |  -.0161835    .019885    -0.81   0.417                -.0635549 
      LN_ROA |  -.0047591   .0584947    -0.08   0.935                -.0063971 
 LN_LEVERAGE |   .0019899   .0081918     0.24   0.808                 .0212641 
     LN_CASH |   .0073416   .0057902     1.27   0.207                 .1063248 
       LN_MB |  -.0063916   .0049789    -1.28   0.201                -.1128802 
      LN_PPE |   .0086531   .0059962     1.44   0.151                 .1329952 
   LN_INTANG |  -.0021743   .0030978    -0.70   0.484                -.0641788 
       _cons |   7.388466   .2552151    28.95   0.000                        . 
 
Table 11 
 
regress LN_ETR LN_ROA LN_LEVERAGE LN_CASH LN_MB LN_PPE LN_INTANG if FAMILY ==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     570 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,   563) =    2.19 
       Model |  .130255453     6  .021709242           Prob > F      =  0.0424 
    Residual |  5.57949834   563  .009910299           R-squared     =  0.0228 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0124 
       Total |  5.70975379   56 
9  .010034717           Root MSE      =  .09955 
 
      LN_ETR |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+--- 
      LN_ROA |    .000216   .0168498     0.01   0.990                 .0005395 
 LN_LEVERAGE |   .0037625   .0034915     1.08   0.282                 .0496861 
     LN_CASH |   .0034738   .0024369     1.43   0.155                 .0632638 
       LN_MB |  -.0047531   .0024537    -1.94   0.053                -.0890262 
      LN_PPE |   .0063124   .0028093     2.25   0.025                 .1026303 
   LN_INTANG |   .0002255   .0013741     0.16   0.870                 .0074507 
       _cons |   7.367506   .0748718    98.40   0.000                        . 
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Table 12 
 
regress LN_ETR LN_ROA LN_LEVERAGE LN_CASH LN_MB LN_PPE LN_INTANG if FAMILY ==0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     298 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,   291) =    1.16 
       Model |  1.34816071     6  .224693451           Prob > F      =  0.3273 
    Residual |  56.3228575   291  .193549339           R-squared     =  0.0234 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0032 
       Total |  57.6710182   297  .194178513           Root MSE      =  .43994 
 
----------------- 
      LN_ETR |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta 
-------------+--- 
      LN_ROA |  -.0293139   .1094189    -0.27   0.789                -.0157036 
 LN_LEVERAGE |   .0070587   .0218639     0.32   0.747                 .0215502 
     LN_CASH |  -.0234072    .015376    -1.52   0.129                -.0927925 
       LN_MB |   .0176317   .0132466     1.33   0.184                 .0852572 
      LN_PPE |  -.0037465   .0143676    -0.26   0.794                -.0178386 
   LN_INTANG |   .0114817   .0078466     1.46   0.144                 .0981612 
       _cons |   7.525032   .4727174    15.92   0.000                        . 
 
